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CHARITABLE SUBSCRIPTION CONTRACTS AN)
THE KENTUCKY LAW
By ROBERT I.

TAYLOR*

In two closely related types of cases, the right to revoke or
withdraw an offer has proved to be a serious problem which has
caused the courts no end of difficulty. In the case of an offer
to enter into a unilateral contract, the question frequently arises
as to whether the offeror may withdraw his offer after the offeree
has commenced, but before he has completed, the requested performance. In the case of subscription agreements, the right of
the subscriber to withdraw from his promise to subscribe, and
the problem of termination of the offer by death, have been the
source of much litigation, and of considerable conflict. Before
considering the problem of charitable subscriptions in Kentucky,
it should prove of value to consider briefly the views which the
courts of the several states have generally taken with respect to
the aforementioned problems. Their similarity makes a somewhat cursory discussion of the former an aid to a more thorough
understanding of the latter.
T=m UNILATERAL CONTRACT
In the case of an offer to enter into a unilateral contract,'
where performance by the offeree was requested, rather than a
promise of performance, the question often arises as to whether
the offer may be withdrawn before performance is complete. The
classic classroom problem, whether the offeror, just before the
offeree has finished climbing the pole or walking across the
bridge, may withdraw his offer of reward for the feat, applies to
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Louisville, School of
Law; A.B., 1927, Yale ULiversity; J.D., 1930, Northwestern University;
Instructor in Law, Valparaiso University, 1933-36;" Assistant Professor
of Law, University of Louisville, 1936-37; Associate Professor of Law
since 1937. Sterling Fellow, Yale University, 1940-41.
'Note, Restatement, Contracts (1932) No. 31, which provides:
"In case of doubt it is presumed that an offer invites the formation of
a bilateral contract by an acceptance amounting in effect to a promise
by the offeree to perform what the offer requests, rather than the formation of one or more unilateral contracts by actual performance on
the part of the offeree." Also see 1 Williston, Contracts (rev. ed. 1936)
see. 60.
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many cases which are arising continually in the courts. The
orthodox view has been that such an offer may be withdrawn at
any time before acceptance is complete; although the offeree has
3
already commenced performance of the act requested, or has
even substantially completed it.4 This view is based upon the
theory that, inasmuch as no consideration could be found to
prevent withdrawal prior to complete acceptance, the offeror
cannot be bound in contract. 5 This rule inevitably led to much
hardship 6 on the part of the offeree, 7 especially in the cases
where the offeror had received no benefit from the part performance, upon which a quasi-contractual action might be based.8
Sensing the harsh results arising under the application of the
orthodox rule, the courts have created exceptions and modifica21ut see Llewellyn, "Our Case-Law of Contract: Offer and Accept.

ance, II" (1939) 48 Yale L.J., 779, 787 where it is said: "Hence, the
question recurs in the classrooms of the country: 'Did he ask for a
promise or for an act-for an act or for a promise?'-with the eternal
suggestion that only one is normally asked for, and that only the one
will do. This makes, as we all know, for superb classroom theatrics;
I know of none which has ever given me personally equal fun. But
the fun comes at a high cost to students' real understanding."
' Alexander Hamilton Institute v Jones, 234 Ill. App. 444 (1924);
Stensgaard v. Smith, 43 Minn. 11, 44 N.W. 669 (1890); Kolb v. Bennett
Land Co., 74, Miss. 567, 21 So. 233 (1897).
Biggers v. Owen, 79 Ga. 658, 5 S.E. '193 (1888); Cook v. Casler,
87 App. Div. 8, 83 N.Y.S. 1045 (1903); Petterson v. Pattberg, 248 N.Y.
86, 161 N.E. 428 (1928)
"In Elliott v. Kazajian, 255 Mass. 459, 152 N.E. 351 (1926) the
court, however, stated that the offeror had no such right of withdrawal
if he acted in bad faith to defeat the offeree's earning his commission.
And see Roberts v. Mays Mills, Inc., 184 N. C. 406, 114 S.E. 530 (1922).
Also see Zwolanek v. Baker Mfg. Co., 150 Wis. 517, 137 N.W. 769 (1912),
where the court said: "It is true, as a general proposition, that a party
making an offer of a reward may withdraw it before it is accepted.
But persons offering rewards must be held to the exercise of good
faith, and cannot arbitrarily withdraw their offers, for the purpose of
defeating payment, when to do so would result in the perpetration of
a fraud upon those who, in good faith, attempted to perform the
service for which the reward was offered."
0 See Llewellyn, "Our Case-Law of Contract: Offer and Acceptance,
II (1939) 48 Yale L.J. 779, 805 where the author says: "In a word, the
older orthodox conception of 'the unilateral,' when it sought to equate
the minimum effective acceptance-In-law with full performance, was
not only unjust and inequitable. It was worse: it was so improbable
as to scandalize good sense." Also see Shattuck, "GratuitousPromises
-A New Writ?" (1937) 35 Mich. L. Rev. 908, 935.
7But see the opposite view expressed by Wormser, "The True
Conception of UnilateralContracts", (1916) 26 Yale L.J., 136, 142 where
the author states that he can see no injustice in the operation of the
doctrine of unilateral contract.
' See Zwolanek v. Baker Mfg. Co., 150 Wis. 526, 137 N.W. 769 (1912)
where a remedy in quantum meruit is suggested.
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tions 9 to such an extent that little remains of the orthodox
view in the more recently decided cases. 10
Various suggestions have been made as to the solution of
this problem, both in article and decision. It has been suggested' that the use of an implied-in-fact contract might solve
the difficulty, since it would compensate tke offeree for what
he has already done for the offeror at the latter's request, and
before the revocation. This would not depend, as would a
remedy in quasi-contract, upon any actual benefit being conferred upon the offeror by the partial performance.
Some courts have held that after partial performance on
the part of the offeree, a binding bilateral contract is formed
which obligates both parties. 12 Thus, the offeree, by his partial
performance, impliedly accepts the offer and promises to complete the performance.
Another view suggested is that from such circumstances a
collateral offer to keep the main offer open may be implied, and
this offer is accepted and becomes binding upon the commencing
of performance by the offeree. 13 Thus by the withdrawal of the
offer before complete performance, the offeror would subject
himself to a suit for damages for breach of the subsidiary
contract. Ordinarily the damages for such breach would amount
to the damages suffered because of the offeror's refusal to
permit the complete acceptance of the original offer, i.e., the
value of the performance promised by the offeror.
A further solution is that a contract arises upon partial
performance by the offeree, but the offeror is not bound to per'See 1 Williston, Contracts (rev. ed. 1936) sec. 60A; Comment,

(1919) 17 Calif. L. Rev. 153, 158.
" In Ruess v. Baron, 217 Cal. 83, 10 P. (2d) 518 (1932), the court
said: "Whatever the logical difficulties involved, the growing tendency
among American courts, working through the more realistic medium of
litigated cases, has been to ameliorate the hardships inherent in holding that such an offer may be revoked at any time before full performance and to hold that such an offer cannot be revoked after the offeree
has done some substantial act looking to performance."

1 Costigan, "Implied-n-Fact Contracts and Mutual Assent," (1920)
33 Harv. L. Rev. 376, 399, footnote 35.
1 Los Angeles Traction Co. v. Wilshire, 135 Cal. 654, 67 Pac. 1086
(1902); Hayes v. Clark, 95 Conn. 510, 111 AtI. 781 (1920); Braniff v.
Blair, 101 Kan. 117, 165 Pac. 816 (1917); Lapham v. Flint, 86 Minn.
376, 90 N.W. 780 (1902); Little Rock Surgical Co. v. Bowers, 227 Mo.
App. 749, 42 S.W. (2d) 367 (1931).
13 McGovney, "Irrevocable Offers"
(1914) 27 Harv.L. Rev. 644.
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form until performance in full has been rendered by the
offeree. 14 This view, which appears to be equitable from the
standpoint of both parties, has been adopted by the Restatement of -the law of Contracts. 15
It is submitted that there might also be grounds for the
operation of a promissory estoppel, where the act was performed at the request of the offeror and in reliance upon his
promise, and to the prejudice of the offeree. 16 If consideration
by estoppel is ever to be countenanced, it should be favored
17
h.ere.
There is also the possibility that the offeree might be
allowed to recover damages in an action of tort, not for the
loss of his bargain, but as compensation for his loss of time and
expenses incurred prior to the revocation, upon the faith that
the offeror would carry out his promise.' s
Thus by a process of judicial legislation, the courts have
been modifying the strict doctrine in favor of a result which is
much more equitable to all of the parties concerned. This has
even been done where the justification for the modification
of the orthodox rule is not present. For example, in Grossman v. Calonia Land and Improvement Co.,1 9 where the
defendant's liability depended upon the time when the contract became complete, the court held that the contract came
into being when the plaintiff undertook the work requested
and proceeded to take measures toward performance, although
14Ballantine, "Acceptance of Offers for Unilateral Contracts by
Partial Performance of the Service Requested" (1921) 5 Minn. L.
Rev. 94. Also see .Brackenbury v. Hodgkin, 116 Me. 399, 102 Atl. 106
(1917) and Corbin, "The Formation of a Unilateral Contract" (1918)
27 Yale L.J. 382, 384 where it is suggested that the court in the above
case probably adopted this view.
's Restatement, Contracts (1932) No. 45 provides: "If an offer for
a unilateral contract is made, and part of the consideration requested
in the offer is given or tendered by the offeree in response thereto, the
offeror is bound by a contract, the duty of immediate performance of
which is conditional on the full consideration being given or tendered
within the time stated in the offer, or, if no time is stated therein,
within a reasonable time." But note criticism of this view in Whittier,
"The Restatement of Contracts and Mutual Assent" (1920) 17 Calif.
L. Rev. 411, 450.
6 See Restatement, Contracts (1932) No. 90; Note (1928) 13 Iowa L.
Rev. 332; Note (1938) 22 Minn. L. Rev. 843; Note (1938) 115 A.L.R. 152.
17See 1 Williston, Contracts (rev. ed. 1936) sec. 139.
's See Welch v. Lawson, 32 Miss. 170 (1856); G. Ober & Sons Co. v.
Katzenstein, 160 N.C. 439, 76 S.E. 476 (1912).
S103 N.I.L. 98, 134 Atl. 740 (1926).
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it was not yet completed. There was no question in the case
of an attempt on the part of the offeror to withdraw before
20
acceptance became complete.
CHARITABLE

SUBSCRIPTIONS IN GENERAL

The charitable subscription problem is similar to that of
unilateral contract in that it, too, involves the right of withdrawal from a promise, where no consideration can be found
to make the agreement binding. In certain instances, where
the charity has entered upon some undertaking or incurred
a liability in reliance upon such promise, the similarity continues in that a definite hardship may result to the promisee
if the agreement is unenforceable. In addition, in the case
of the charitable subscription, where there has been no actual
reliance upon the promise, there exists the doctrine of public
policy which appears definitely to favor the charity recovering on the subscription agreement. The fact that charities
of this nature are so largely dependent upon private contributions makes this result all the more desirable from the
standpoint of the general welfare.
In spite of the desirability of this result, there has been
considerable conflict in the decisions attempting a solution of
the difficulty. 21 Here again the orthodox rule would defeat
the enforcement of a gratuitous promise to donate a sum of money
to a charity, 22 if the promisor voluntarily withdrew his offer or
died, before the transaction had been completed by the actual
presentation and acceptance of the money. If the gift had
been finally executed there could, of course, be no recovery
from the charity of the amount so given. But where the
-IBut note criticism of this case (1927) 75 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 268.
Also see contra in a somewhat similar situation, George I. Cramer,
Inc. v. Patterson, 25 Ohio App. 130, 157 N.E. 398 (1926).
21In Tioga County General Hospital v. Tidd, 164 Misc. 273, 298
N.Y.S. 460 (1937), the court said: "Confusion has long existed relative
to the rules to be applied to charitable subscriptions. The law has
been unsettled. A naked promise to give without consideration not
being enforceable, the doctrine of contractual relationship was evolved
to sustain liability upon a promise if there was any consideration
whatever for the promise, and lately has been supplemented and
extended by the doctrine of so-called promissory eseoppel."
" Even if the subscription agreement stated that it was given "for
value received," this may be questioned by evidence of the entire transaction tending to show that in fact no such consideration was ever
given. See In re Griswold's Estate, 113 Neb. 256, 202 N.W. 609 (1925).

K. L. J.-3
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promise is still executory, the courts of England,23 of Canada,
and of the United States in some of the earlier decisions 25 have

followed the orthodox view that the promisor may withdraw
at any time before the acceptance has become complete, 20 unless

there has been some consideration to make the agreement binding. Although most of the more recent decisions in this country
seem to favor the upholding of the agreement upon one ground

or another, a number of comparatively recent cases2 7 may be
found which still deny a recovery in this situation. However,
the process of judicial legislation again appears to be at work,

and the weight of authority in the United States2 8 now enforces
the subscription agreement under one or more of the various

theories that have been adopted by the courts. 29 Before examining the Kentucky cases, it should prove helpful to note the
In re Hudson, 54 L.J.Ch. 811 (1885).
24Dalhousie College v. Boutilier, S.C.R. 642 (Can. 1934).
25
The Trustees of Phillips Limerick Academy v. Davis, 11 Mass.
113 (1814); The Trustees of Hamilton College v. Stewart, 1 N.Y. 581
(1848); Presbyterian Church of Albany v. Cooper, 112 N.Y. 517,
20 N.E. 352 (1889); Twenty-third St. Baptist Church v. Cornwell, 117
N.Y. 606, 23 N.E. 177 (1890); In re Smith's Estate, 69 Vt. 382, 38 Atl. 66
(1897).
11The courts are even more likely to reach this result, of course,
where the subscription is not to a charity, and there is no question
of public policy involved. See Culver v. Banning, 19 Minn. 303 (1872).
" Cutwright v. Preacher's Aid Society, 271 Ill. App. 168 (1933);
Trustees of LaGrange College v. Parker, 198 Mo. App. 372, 200 S.W.
663 (1918); In re Barker's Estate, 249 App. Div. 336, 293 N.Y.S. 199
(1937). In the case of American University v. Todd, 1 A. (2d) 595
(Del. 1938), the acknowledgment of one dollar paid as consideration
was held insufficient, since a consideration of one dollar will not usually
support a promise to pay a larger sum of money. Also see 1 Williston, Contracts (rev. ed. 1936) sec. 115. In the case of In re Tummonds'
Estate, 160 Misc. 137, 290 N.Y.S. 40 (1936), the court held that the subscription was unenforceable for lack of consideration, inasmuch as
nothing was done by the promisee with the knowledge of the promisor,
in reliance thereon, which in any way altered its position. However,
even though a subscription is considered as based upon a sufficient
consideration when made, it may become unenforceable where the
promisee charity, before the subscription has been paid, becomes insolvent and is liquidated, so that it is unable to hold and use such a
fund. In this situation it is doubtful whether there is any question of
public policy involved. See Rutherford College v. Payne, 209 N.C.
792, 184 S.E. 827 (1936).
18
8 See 1 Williston, Contracts (rev. ed. 1936) sec. 116; (1930)
Calif. L. Rev. 314. Also see Notes (1914) 48 L.R.A. (N.S.) 783, (1925)
38 A.L.R. 868, (1926) 44 A.L.R. 1340, (1928) 57 A.L.R. 986, (1935) 95

A.L.R. 1305.
29For a general discussion of the problem, see Billig, "The Problem of Consideration in Charitable Subscriptions" (1927) 12 Corn.
L, Q. 467.
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general trend of the decisions throughout the country with
respect to this problem.
Where the subscription agreement is in the form of a
promise to make a loan of money, rather than an outright gift,
such as in the case of a promise to buy a bond to be issued by the
recipient charity, it seems as if the general problem of charitable
subscriptions would not be involved. The promisor should not
be held to the full amount of his subscription, and his liability
should be limited to the payment of only nominal damages, 30
as in the usual case of failure to comply with an agreement to
loan a sum of money. Although it has been so held, 31 the courts
do not always make such a distinction, and have allowed a
recovery of the full amount so subseribed. 32 Under such
decisions, the general problem remains as to whether the
charitable subscription may be enforced.
In dealing with the general problem of upholding subscription agreements, the view adopted by most of the courts
seems to be that if it can be found that work has been undertaken, or liability has been incurred, as a result of the promise
to subscribe, the promise becomes binding upon the subscriber. 33
It thus partakes of the nature of a unilateral contract, the
acceptance occurring upon the undertaking of the work or the
incurring of the liability. It has even been held that, where
the subscription was conditioned upon the raising of an
3 See McMillain Lumber Co. v. First National Bank of Eutaw,
215 Ala. 379, 110 So. 602 (1927); McCormick, Damages (1935) sec. 139.
31See Eaton v. Reich, 258 N.Y. 202, 179 N.E. 385 (1932).
'*United Masonic Temple Corp. v. Harris, 242 Ill. App. 296 (1926);
American Legion v. Thompson, 121 Kan. 124, 245 Pac. 744 (1926);
Huron Lodge v. Hinckley, 50 S.D. 355, 210 N.W. 200 (1926).
3 Trustees of Baker University v. Clelland, 86 F. (2d) 14 (C.C.A.
8th, 1936); Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Bryn Mawr Trust Co.,
87 F. (2d) 607 (C.C.A. 3rd, 1936); In re Estate of Wheeler, 284 Ill. App.
132, 1 N.E. (2d) 425 (1936); Trustees of Farmington Academy v. Allen,
14 Mass. 172 (1817); Hardin College v. Johnson, 221 Mo. App. 285, 3
S.W. (2d) 264 (1928); I. & I. Holding Corporation v. Gainsburg, 276
N.Y. 427, 12 N.E. (2d) 532 (1938); Trustees of Uni. of Pa. v. Cadwalader, 277 Pa. 512, 121 Atl. 314 (1923); University of Vermont v. Buell,
2 Vt. 45 (1829); Eastern States Agricultural and Industrial League v.
Vail's Estate, 97 Vt. 495, 124 Atl. 568 (1924). In Erdman v. Trustees of
Eutaw M.P. Church, 129 Md. 595, 99 Atl. 793 (1917), the borrowing of
money to pay off a past debt was deemed a sufficient liability to supply
the consideration necessary to uphold the subscription. But see
University of Des Moines v. Livingston, 57 Iowa 307, 10 N.W. 738
(1881), where the court inferred that there was no consideration for
subscriptions given for the purpose of paying off a past debt, where
no new liability was incurred as a result of such subscriptions.
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additional sum of money, the time, labor and expense of raising such amount should constitute good consideration for the
promise. 34 In reaching this result, which binds the subscription
upon the commencing of the work and before completion, it again
is necessary to overthrow the orthodox doctrine of contracts,
requiring that for the offer to become irrevocable, the performance called for must have been completed. However, if
the courts can modify the rule as to unilateral contracts in
general, there seems to be no reason why subscription agreements should not also be so treated. 35 Another difficulty with
the above view is that when the promise was made, the parties
ordinarily had no intention that acceptance, by means of some
partial performance or assumption of liability, should supply
the consideration necessary to make the promise irrevocable.3 6
The courts adopting this view are thus interpreting the instrument in the light of events occurring subsequent to the making
of the pledge. On the contrary, any intention of the parties
with respect to the subscription, should be shown as of the time
of the making of the promise.37
Closely resembling the cases which have adopted this result
are those which have enforced charitable subscriptions by finding a promissory estoppel as a substitute for consideration. 38 In
accord with this view, the Restatement of the law of Contracts 39
provides: "A promise which the promisor should reasonably
expect to induce action or forbearance of a definite and substantial character on the part of the promisee and which does
induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be
"Baptist Education Society v. Carter, 72 Ill. 247 (1874).
See Restatement, Contracts (1932) No. 45, footnote 15 supra.
See infra, footnote 52.
37 See 3 Williston, Contracts (rev. ed. 1936) sec. 826.
'Miller v. Western College, 177 Ill. 280, 52 N.E. 432 (1898); Southwestern College of Winfield v. Hawley, 144 Kan. 652, 62 P. (2d) 850
(1936). In Allegheny College v. National Chautauqua County Bank
of Jamestown, 246 N.Y. 369, 159 N.E. 173 (1927), the court said:
"Certain, at least, it is that we have adopted the doctrine of promissory
estoppel as the equivalent of consideration in connection with our law
of charitable subscriptions." Also see Simpson Centenary College v.
Tuttle, 71 Iowa 596, 33 N.W 74 (1887). For a general discussion of
promissory estoppel see: N6te (1938) 115 A.L.R. 152; Note (1928)
13 Iowa L. Rev. 332; Note (1938) '22 Minn. L. Rev. 843. And also see
Ricketts v. Scothorn, 57 Neb. 51, 77 N. W. 365 (1898); Fluckey v.
Anderson, 132 Neb. 664, 273 N.W. 41 (1937); Fried v. Fisher, 328 Pa.
497, 196 Atl. 39 (1938).
"Restatement, Contracts (1932) No. 90.
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avoided only by enforcement of the promise. "40 This situation,
however, should hardly be considered as coming within the
classification of estoppel, inasmuch as the promisor merely
indicates an intention to fulfill his agreement, and the promisee
who knows that fact, or should know it, is not justified in relying upon the statement. It is entirely different from the case
where the misrepresentation is of an existing fact, where the
other party may justifiably rely upon it and be protected from
41
injury by means of an estoppel.
The difficulty with the application of either of these first
two views is that frequently there has not yet been any work
undertaken, nor any liability or detriment incurred, before
revocation, so that neither consideration by acceptance, nor
consideration by estoppel may be invoked.
Some jurisdictions have followed the view that each subscriber's promise may be considered as adequate consideration
for each other subscriber's promise. 42 This view is difficult
to support, inasmuch as a promise is ordinarily not made to the
other subscribers, but directly to the charity, 4 3 often without any
knowledge of the identity of the other subscribers and without
"In the early case of Caul v. Gibson, 3 Pa. 416 (1846), the court
seemed to base its decision on the presence of moral consideration,
rather than on estoppel. The court said: "When the inhabitants of a
village or neighborhood sign a subscription authorizing the building
of a church for the public worship of God, and the persons so authorized
proceed to erect the house, there is a moral obligation in s1 the subscribers to fulfill their engagements. A moral obligation has ever been
held a sufficient consideration to support an express promise, but not
an implied one." However, a moral obligation generally is not recognized as sufficient consideration in the United States. See I Williston,
Contracts (rev. ed. 1936) sec. 148. In the later case of Gans v. Reimensnyder, 110 Pa. 17, 2 Atl. 425 (1885), the Pennsylvania court suggested
that such a contract should be enforced by way of estoppel rather than
on the ground of consideration in the original undertaking.
1See 1 Williston, Contracts (rev. ed. 1936) sec. 139.
"Commissioner of Internad Revenue v. Bryn Mawr Trust Co.,
87 F. (2d) 607 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1936); University of Southern California
v. Bryson, 103 Cal. App. 39, 283 Pac. 949 (1930); Wilson v. First Presbyterian Church of Savannah, 56 Ga. 554 (1876); Petty v. Trustees
of the Church of Christ, 95 Ind. 278 (1883); Cotner College v. Hyland,
133 Kan. 322, 299 Pac. 607 (1931). Also see Christian College v. Hendley, 49 Cal. 347, (1874); Underwood v. Waldron, 12 Mich. 73 (1863).
And see 2 Williston, Contracts (rev. ed. 1936) sec. 377.
"See American University v. Todd, 1 A. (2d) 595 (Del. 1938);
Cottage Street Church v. Kendall, 121 Mass. 528 (1877); Orphans'
Home Ass'n. v. Sharp's Exec., 6 Mo. App. 150 (187-8); L & I. Holding
Corporation v. Gainsburg, 276 N. Y. 427, 12 N. E. (2d) 532 (1938).
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being induced by any other subscriptions. 44

In addition, even

if it were admitted that the promise was made directly to the
other subscribers and in reliance upon their subscriptions, there
could be no recovery by the charity in those jurisdictions where
a donee beneficiary still is not permitted to sue upon a contract made for his benefit.4 5 The courts which have followed
this general view have, by means of a fiction, enforced a contract
among the various subscribers themselves, which they probably
had no intention of making. In most of the cases, the intention
of the subscriber has been to deal with the charity alone and not
with the other subscribers. There might possibly be some justification for upholding this view in cases where the multi-lateral
arrangement has been brought to the attention of the subscribers by means of subscription blanks stipulating that each
subscriber agrees to pay in consideration of like promises on
the part of other subscribers. 46 But even then, it is doubtful
"See I Williston, Contracts (rev. ed. 1936) sec. 116. Even where
the subscription is made conditional upon the subscribing of a certain
amount, such a requirement should ordinarily be construed as a condition of the offer and not as consideration. Thus the offer might be
revoked prior to performance of the condition. See Beach v. First
M. E. Church, 96 Ill.177 (1880). However, the effort made in fulfilling the condition by securing other subscriptions has been held to
be sufficient consideration. Roberts v. Cobb, 103 N. Y. 600, 9 N. E. 500
(1886). Also, if there has been a request by the subscriber, that certain designated subscribers be secured, the securing of such subscribers
is sufficient consideration. In re Conger's Estate, 113 Misc. 129, 184
N. Y. S. 74 (1920); Washington Heights M. E. Church v. Comfort,
138 Misc. 236, 246 N. Y. S. 450 (1930).
"See 2 Williston, Contracts (rev. ed. 1936) sec. 368. Also see
Brown v. Ford Motor Co., 48 F. (2d) 732 (C. C. A. 10th, 1931); Nims
v. Ford, 159 Mass. 575, 35 N. E. 100 (1893); New York Central R. R.
v. Central Vermont Ry., 243 Mass. 56, 136 N. E. 825 (1922); Knights
of the Modern Maccabees v. Sharp, 163 Mich. 449, 128 N. W. 786 (1910);
Witzman v. Sjoberg, 164 Minn. 411, 205 N. W. 257 (1925); Fulford v.
Cleveland, 55 S. D. 509, 226 N. W. 739 (1929); Fugure v. Mutual Society
of St. Joseph, 46 Vt. 362 (1874). But see Rogers v. Galloway Female
College, 64 Ark. 627, 44 S. W. 454 (1898) allowing a recovery by the
college as the beneficiary of a subscription agreement in a jurisdiction
which does not ordinarily allow a donee beneficiary to recover In an
action at law.
"It was so held in University of Southern California v. Bryson,
103 Cal. App. 39, 283 Pac. 949 (1929). The subscription agreement
read: "In consideration of my interest in Christian education and in
consideration of others subscribing toward raising of a Million Dollars
for endowment and equipment for the University, I hereby subscribe
and will pay to the University of Southern California, at Los Angeles,
California, the sum of etc." Allowing a recovery on this agreement
after the death of the subscriber, the court said: "Construing the
entire instrument in this manner, it is quite apparent the note was
not intended as a mere gift without consideration, . . . It was
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whether the subscribers had any intention of dealing with, or in
relation to, the other subscribers, although they signed a subscription blank which so indicated.
It has been provided in at least one jurisdiction, by
statute, that the subscribers' promises may be considered as consideration for each other, 47 so that the charity may be allowed
a recovery on that basis alone, without the necessity of showing
48
any other consideration.
Another view, which has been adopted in a somewhat
smaller number of cases, is that when the beneficiary accepts
the subscription, such acceptance implies a promise to use the
funds in the manner desired by the subscriber, and this implied
promise constitutes sufficient consideration to support the subscriber's agreement. 40 Thus the contract becomes bilateral,
and is binding upon both parties at the time when the subscription is accepted, so that the subscriber cannot thereafter
executed and delivered with the express reciprocal condition that other
subscribers would execute similar notes with the object of raising a
million-dollar fund for the 'endowment and equipment' of the University of Southern California. This would furnish a consideration
for the note. A gift is a voluntary transfer of property without consideration, but a donation may be founded on a consideration." Also
see (1937) 22 Wash. U. L. Q. 434. But see contra, Presbyterian Church
of Albany v. Cooper, 112 N. Y. 517, 20 N. E. 352 (1889) where the
court said that the mutual promises between the subscribers, recited
as consideration in the subscription agreement, could not be considered
as such because there was no privity of contract between the charity
and the promisors.
"Ga. Code (1933) see. 20-304 provides: "A promise of another
is a good consideration for a promise. In mutual subscriptions for
a common object, the promise of the others is a good consideration
for the promise of each."
4 See Owenby v. Georgia Baptist Assembly, 137 Ga. 698, 74 S.E.
56 (1912); Miller v. Oglethorpe University, 24 Ga. App. 388, 100 S.E.
784 (1919); Glass v. Grant, 46 Ga. App. 327, 167 S. E. 727 (1933).
But note Young Men's Christian Ass'n. v. Estill, 140 Ga. 291, 78 S.E.
1075 (1913) where it was stated that the statutory provision had
application to mutual subscriptions, which meant written promises
entered into by the subscribers, and that it was not broad enough to
include oral promises.
41Trustees of Baker University v. Clelland, 86 F. (2d) 14 (C. C. A.
8th, 1936); Central Maine General Hospital v. Carter, 125 Me. 191,
132 Atl. 417 (1926); Scottish Rite Temple Ass'n of Kansas City v.
Lucksinger, 231 Mo. App. 486, 101 S.W. (2d) 511 (1937); In re Griswold's Estate, 113 Neb. 256, 202 N. W. 609 (1925); Allegheny College
v. National Chautauqua Bank of Jamestown, 246 N. Y. 369, 159 N. E.
173, 57 A. L. R. 980 (1927); Russian Symphony Society, Inc. v. Holstein, 199 App. Div. 353, 192 N. Y. S.64 (1922); Tioga County General
Hospital v. Tidd, 164 Misc. 273, 298 N. Y. S.460 (1937); Presbyterian
Board of Foreign Missions v. Smith, 209 Pa. 361, 58 Atl. 689 (1940).
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withdraw. 50 The difficulty with this view, is that, although
there may be an implied promise to use the funds according to
the terms of the subscription, still such promise was ordinarily
not intended as the consideration for the promise of the subscriber. 51 In order to find a consideration, it is necessary that
there be some intended exchange requested in return for the
promise. 5-2 This is all the more true, where there has been no
limitation as to use annexed to the gift. 5 3 In addition, since the
authorities appear to hold that the charitable uses designated
by the donor cannot be changed, so long as the fund can be applied to such purposes, the implied promise of the donee to so
use such fund does not supply any additional consideration for
the promise of the donor, 54 unless such performance differs in
some respect from that which was already due. 55 Of course,
under certain circumstances, the acceptance of the subscription
by the charity may include an expressed undertaking or promise
on its part to use the fund as designated.58 In such case, the
promise itself supplies the requisite consideration, and the subscriber becomes bound upon such acceptance. Also, if a memorial requested by the subscriber has already been established
by the charity, then the creation of the memorial would, in
In Trustees of Baker University v. Clelland, 86 F. (2d) 14, 20
(C. C. A. 8th, 1936) the court said: "When the promisee subjected
itself to such a duty at the implied request of the promisor, the result
There was a
was the creation of a bilateral agreement. . ..

promise on the one side and on the other a return promise, made, it
is true, by implication, but expressing an obligation that had been

exacted as a condition of the payment. A bilateral agreement may
exist though one of the mutual promises be a promise 'implied in

fact', an inference from conduct as opposed to an inference from
words."
11See 1 Williston, Contracts (rev. ed . 1936) sec. 116.
"See Clark, Contracts (4th ed. 1931) sec. 27; 1 Williston, Contracts (rev. ed. 1936) sees. 111, 112. Also see Fire Insurance Association v. Wickham, 141 U. S. 564, 12 Sup. Ct. 84 (1891); Kirksey v.
Kirksey, 8 Ala. 131 (1845).
0 See In re Smith's Estate, 69 Vt. 382, 38 Atl. 66 (1897).
51See State ex re7. Crutze v. Toney, 141 Or. 406, 17 P. (2d) 1105
k1933).
5
Restatement, Contracts (1932) sec. 84 provides: "Consideration
is not insufficient because of the fact

.

.

..

(c)

that the party

giving the consideration is then bound by a duty owed to the promisor

to render some performance similar to that
or to the public, . .
given or promised, if the act or forbearance given or promised as
consideration differs in any way from what was previously due."
'%Williams College v. Danforth, 29 Mass. 541 (1832); New Jersey

Orthopaedic Hospital & Dispensary v. Wright, 95 N. 3. L. 462, 113 AUt.
144 (1921).
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itself, constitute sufficient consideration for the promise, and
57
the subscriber could not thereafter retract.
In a number of decisions, the courts have recognized more
than one of the aforementioned views, 58 and indeed in some
of the cases all of them have been discussed.5 9 In so doing, the
court in question may perhaps deem itself somewhat more justified in departing from the orthodox view and in allowing a
recovery against the subscriber who has attempted to revoke.
From time to time, various other suggestions have been
made reaching the same result, although by different methods
of reasoning. For example, it has been asserted ° that through
the satisfaction for contemporary recognition, the subscriber
has received a benefit which he was otherwise not entitled to receive, and therefore that might supply the necessary consideration. Even more broadly, it has been claimed in a number of
cases 0 ' that consideration may be found in the prospect of the
public good resulting from the charity, which itself constitutes
value to the subscriber. In addition, the charity has been
favored by the suggestion 2 that in the case of a written promise
to subscribe, there was a presumption of consideration which
must be overcome by the defendant, thus placing the burden of
proof as to lack of consideration upon the subscriber and giving
a definite advantage to the promisee.
Probably the soundest solution of the difficulty would be
to allow the charity to recover on the basis of public policy
alone, without attempting to find any consideration for the
promise. 3 This could be done on the theory that, in this par-

"7
See First Trust & Savings Bank of Pasadena v. Coe Coliege,
8 Cal. App. (2d) 195, 47 P. (2d) 481 (1935).
"University of Southern California v. Bryson, 103 Cal. App. 39,
283 Pac. 949 (1929); In re Estate of Wheeler, 284 Ill. App. 132, 1 N. E.
(2d) 425 (1936); Trustees of Troy Conference Academy v. Nelson,
24 Vt. 189 (1852).
"Furman University v. Waller, 124 S. C. 68, 117 S. E. 356 (1923).
But note that in Dalhousie v. Boutilier, S. C. R. 642 (Can. 1934) the
court discusses and rejects all of these views.
O'Note (1928) 27 Mich. L. Rev. 88, 91.
"Barnett v. Franklin College, 10 Ind. App. 103, 37 N. E. 427
(1894); Simpson Centenary College v. Tuttle, 71 Iowa 596, 33 N. W. 74
(1887); Board of Trustees v. Noyes, 165 Iowa 601, 146 N. W. 848
(1914); Underwood v. Waldron, 12 Mich. 73 (1863).
61First Presbyterian Church v. Dennis, 178 Iowa 1352, 161 N. W.
183 (1917).
6 In accord with this view, see Billig, "The Problem of Consideration in Oharitable Subscriptions" (1927) 12 Corn. L. Q. 467, 479. Also
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ticular type of fact situation, no consideration is necessary.
This would be a happy solution to the problem, especially where
the subscription agreement was in writing,64 giving it the
attributes of a sealed instrument at common law.66 In two
comparatively recent cases, the courts have recognized, not
only that public policy should play a part in such decisions,
but also that it does actually influence the court substantially
in arriving at such a conclusion. In the case of In re Wheeler's
Estate,s6 the court said: "Fundamentally, defendant's argument is based upon the proposition that no enforceble pledge
to leave a bequest to a philanthropic organization can be made.
For the courts to sustain this position would substantially
injure, if not destroy, all endowment funds, which, as is well
known, are umiversally created in this country by such pledges.
The injury to churches, schools, hospitals, and similar agencies
for good would be irreparable. We cannot give our assent to
this." In Allegheny College v. National Chautauquza County
Bank of Jamestown,Ot7 Cardozo, C. J., said: * * * the moulds of
consideration as fixed by the old doctrine were subjected to a
like expansion. Very likely, conceptions of public policy have
shaped, more or less subconsciously, the rulings thus made.
Judges have been affected by the thought that 'defenses of that
character' are 'breaches of faith towards the public, and especially towards those engaged in the same enterprise, and an
unwarrantable disappointment of the reasonable expectations
see Shattuck, "Gratuitous Promises-A New Writ?" (1937) 35 Mich.
L. Rev. 908, 932 where it is said: "The unanimity of result would, however, seem to indicate that this divergence in language is immaterial
and that charitable subscriptions are enforced for just one reasonthe courts have concluded that public policy makes desirable their
enforcement." Also see Note (1928) 28 Col. L. Rev. 642, 646.
" This result could be achieved by an adoption of the Uniform
Written Obligations Act, which in Sec. 1 provides: "A written release
or promise hereafter made and signed by the person releasing or
promising shall not be invalid or unenforceable for lack of consideration, if the writing also contains an additional express statement, in
any form of language, that the signer intends to be legally bound."
See Note (1928) 76 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 580. Also it has been held that,
where there is a statute providing that instruments in writing
promising to pay a sum of money shall import a consideration, a
charitable subscription comes within such a provision. Trustees of
Christian University v. Hoffman, 95 Mo. App. 488, 69 S.W. 474 (1902).
1 "At common law a sealed instrument or covenant was binding by
its own force." 1 Williston, Contracts (rev. ed. 1936) sec. 109. Also
Plucknett, "A Concise History of the Common Law" (1929) p. 402.
284 Ill. App. 132, 1 N. E. (2d) 425, 431 (1936).
'246 N. Y. 369, 159 N. E. 173, 175 (1927).
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of those interested.' " Even as early as 1870, a progressive
Illinois court 8 said: "As a matter of public policy, courts
have been desirous of sustaining the legal obligations of subscriptions of this character, * * *." And in a recent dissenting
opinion,6 9 it was suggested that "Recognizing the fact that a
charitable subscription is intended as a gift and not as a bargain, it may well be that the time has come for the Legislature
to say that a charitable subscription requires no consideration to make it enforceable." The public policy aspects of the
problem were also ably treated by Shauck, J. in the case of
Irwin v. Lombard University, 70 where he said: "The general
course of decisions is favorable to the binding obligation of
such promises. They have been influenced, not only by such
reasons as those already stated, but in some cases, at least,
by state policy as indicated by constitutional and statutory provisions. The policy of this state, as so indicated, is promotive of education, religion and philanthropy. In addition to
the declarations of the constitution upon the subject, the policy
of the state is indicated by numerous legislative enactments providing for the incorporation of colleges, churches, and other
institutions of philanthropy, which are intended to be perpetual, and which, not only for their establishment, but for
their perpetual maintenance, are authorized to receive contributions from those who are in sympathy with their purposes and
methods,-the only source from which, in view of their nature,
their support can be derived. Looking to the plainly declared
purpose of the lawmaking department, promises made with a
view to discharging the debts of such institutions, to providing the means for the employment of teachers, to establishing endowment funds to give them greater stability and efficiency, and whatever may be necessary or helpful to accomplish their purposes or secure their permanency, must be held
valid. A view which omits considerations of this character is
too narrow to be technically correct." 71 It is noteworthy that
6Trustees of the Methodist Episcopal Church v. Garvey, 53 Ill. 401,

403 (1870).

I. & I. Holding Corporation v. Gainsburg, 251 App. Div. 550,
296 N. Y. S. 752, 762 (1937).
" 56 Ohio St. 9, 46 N. E. 63, 65 (1897).
1 See Note (1928) 28 Col. L. Rev. 642, 644, footnote 15, where, in
commenting on this statement, it is said: "The court here shows a
drift towards enforcing such subscriptions on the grounds of public
policy, rather than as bargains."
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as early as 1897 an opinion should foretell so clearly what trend
the decisions would take during the next four decades. All of
these statements indicate the strong influence of public policy
in decisions sustaining the charity's right of action on the
subscription agreement, whether or not specifically recognized
by the court as such.
It is thus apparent that the tendency today, even more than
in the earlier cases, is to enforce the subscription agreement, 72
by whatever means, usually giving it the force of a binding
contract from its inception. It is evident that this result is
desirable, however illogical 7 3 may be the reasoning of the courts
in reaching this conclusion. It would, however, be preferable
to say that, since this is a desirable result to be achieved, and
most of the courts admit this, the situation calls for the adoption of a new principle of law, such as that suggested where
contracts have been made for the benefit of third persons, 74
and consequently, in this type of case, consideration is unnecessary. Inasmuch as most subscription agreements are in
writing, or could easily be so made, it might be advisable to
limit this result to those cases where the agreement is in writing
and signed by the subscriber, and thus may be readily proved.
If the present trend of these decisions continues, and there
is no reason to doubt that it will, it is likely that the courts
will reach, some such conclusion, 75 and will cease striving to
find the justification for a result which they know to be desirable. The present confusion in the various cases will then
no longer exist, and the law will be clarified as well as simplified.
1
2See Goble, "Trends in the Theory of Oontracts in the United
States" (1937) 11 Tulane L. Rev. 412, 415.
7 In I. & I. Holding Corporation v. Gainsburg, 276 N. Y. 427, 12
N. E. (2d) 532, 534 (1938), the court stated: "We realize that the
principles upon which courts of differing jurisdictions have placed
their decisions sustaining subscriptions for charitable purposes are
all subject to criticism from a legalistic standpoint."
7 See 2 Williston, Contracts (rev. ed. 1936) see. 357-; Restatement, Contracts (1932) See. 135.
7 For example, in the case of Aetna Life Insurance Company v.
Maxwell, 89 F. (2d) 988, 994 (C. C. A. 4th, 1937) involving the right
of recovery of a third party benefficiary, the court said: ". . . . but,
in view of the numerous decisions in which the right has been recognized irrespective of statute in both federal and state courts, it must
now be considered as firmly established as a principle of general commercial law."
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THE KENTUCKY CASES
It is unfortunate, in considering the Kentucky law on
the subject, that so few cases involving the specific problem

of charitable subscriptions have reached the Kentucky Court
of Appeals. However, this tends to accentuate, rather than
diminish, the importance of giving thought to the Kentucky
charitable institution, and its right to enforce a subscription
agreement. Because of this dearth of reported cases, it is
necessary to also consider some other types of subscription agreements, inasmuch as the problems are in many ways parallel as
to issue and treatment.
Ordinarily, the subscription is in writing and in some instances it may prove difficult to determine whether the writing
constitutes an actual subscription agreement, or merely evidences an intention to subscribe in the future." 6 It may be necessary to look at other statements of the alleged subscriber, and
other circumstances surrounding the issance of the writing, to
determine what the intention really was. It is not necessary
that the subscriber, in order to be bound, shall have signed
the paper himself. That may even be done by his solicitor,
provided it can be clearly shown that the subscriber authorized
the solicitor to sign as his agent.7 7 Indeed, it is not even required that a valid and binding subscription agreement shall
be in writing. An oral subscription is a valid and enforceable contract, 78 although the problem of proof may present
some difficulties and would involve a question of fact to be
submitted to the jury. The provision of the statute of frauds,
that contracts not to be performed within a year must be in
writing to be enforceable, does not apply to such verbal subscriptions, inasmuch as it is usually possible that such a contract may be completely performed within a year.79
One of the problems seemingly encountered with subscription agreements in Kentucky involves the conditional
pledge, the agreement conditioned upon some performance or
7 Tompkins, Adm'x. v. Southern Baptist Theological Seminary,
8 Ky. L. Rep. 191 (1880).
77Baskett v. Ohio Valley Banking and Trust Co., 125 S. W. 1066
(Ky. 1910).
"Lewis v. Durham, 205 Ky. 403, 265 S. W. 934 (1924).
'Bullock v. Falmouth & Chipman Hall Turnpike Road Co., 85 Ky.
184, 3 S. W. 129 (1887).
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event which the defendant claims has not yet occurred. This
condition usually takes the form of an express qualification
in the written agreement. For example, in the case of Goff
v. Winchester College,"0 the paper which was signed contained a provision that until, in the judgment of the subscribers, a sum sufficient to effectuate the objects of the association had been subscribed, they were not to be liable upon
their subscriptions for any debts contracted by the promise.
Frequently, the subscription is conditioned upon a certain
amount of money being subscribed or raised. 81 Where subscriptions are for the purpose of constructing a road or highway, the agreement may contain a condition that the road shall
be of a certain type of construction,8 2 built within a certain
time or prior to the construction of some other road,8 3 or
that it should be located along a certain designated route.8 4
Sometimes the condition is in the form of a verbal limitation,85
and it is effective even though the subscription agreement
itself was in writing. Oral testimony may be admitted to show
that the written subscription was delivered upon a condition,
inasmuch as the testimony does not contradict or vary the terms
of the writing, but merely shows that the writing never became
effective as a binding obligation.8 6 In such a situation the
parol evidence rule does not apply.
Less often, a condition may be implied as a provision of
the subscription agreement, as in the case where the court decided that the subscription for the purpose of constructing
a railroad could not be enforced until such railroad company
had become incorporated and established in business. 87 But
8*69 Ky. 443 (1869).

'I Kentucky Live Stock Breeders' Ass'n. v. Miller, 119 Ky. 393, 84
S. W. 301 (1905).
8 Breckinridge County v. Beard, 233 Ky. 823, 27 S. W. (2d) 427
(1930).
8 Livingston County v. Evans, 220 Ky. 187, 294 S. W. 1044 (1927).
'4Webb v. Dunn, 198 Ky. 111, 248 S. W. 840 (1923); Brown v.
Farmers' Deposit Bank, 223 Ky. 171, 3 S. W. (2d) 215 (1928).
"Eagles, Treasurer v. Hafendorfer, 204 Ky. 696, 265 S. W. 35
(1924).
8Vance v. Dobson, 205 Ky. 640, 266 S. W. 368 (1924).
87
Brooksvible R. R. v. Byron, 20 Ky. L. Rep. 1941, 50 S. W. 530
(1899). But see Central University of Kentucky v. Walters' Ex'rs,
122 Ky. 65, 90 S. W. 1066 (1906) where it was held that a charitable
corporation, other than the one to whom the pledge had been made,
could sue upon the promise where the promisee corporation had
become consolidated with the plaintiff corporation, so long as the
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where a subscription is made to a corporation, such as a college,
before actual incorporation, such subscription may be accepted
or enforced after it becomes incorporated, 88 since the implied
condition requiring incorporation has been complied with.
Except in the case of the implied condition, it must be
clearly shown that there was a mutual understanding of the
parties as to the existence and provisions of the condition,8 9
and not merely that it was the understanding on the part of
the subscriber alone. 90 Also, the subscriber who has signed
a paper, mistakenly thinking that certain conditions are appended thereto, may be estopped to set this up, in cases where
obligations have been incurred or money has been expended, 91
or where other subscribers have been secured, 92 upon the faith
of his particular subscription.
Where the presence of a condition limiting the effect of
the subscription has been admitted or proved, the subscriber's
liability is dependent upon the performance of such condition.0 3 Therefore, if the condition provides that the subscribers shall not be bound until a certain amount is subscribed,
no liability can accrue until that amount has been subscribed. 94
Likewise, a subscription made for carrying out one specific
purpose cannot be enforced by a corporation incorporated and
operated for an entirely different purpose. 95 A condition,
that the road contemplated must be the first built,9 6 or completed within a certain period, 97 must be complied with before
latter undertook to do the thing originally undertaken

and the
original subscription was not conditioned and limited to the original
charity.
"'Anderson v. West Kentucky College, 10 Ky. L. Rep. 725 (1889).
Tunnell's Mill & Simpson's Creek Turnpike Road Co. v. Selec.
man, 14 Ky. L. Rep. 174 (1892); Lewis v. Durham, 205 Ky. 403, 265
S. W. 934 (1924).
"Lackey v. Richmond and Lancaster Turnpike Road Co., 56 Ky.
43 (1856).
"Wilgus v. Trustees of Cincinnati Southern R. R., 10 Ky. Opin.
566 (1880).
"Jett v. Brooksville & 0. R. R., 212 Ky. 197, 278 S. W. 607 (1925).
' See 3 Williston, Contracts (rev. ed. 1036) sec. 666A; Restatement, Contracts (1932) Sec. 250.
"Goff v. Winchester College, 69 Ky. 443 (1869); Scott v. Blanton,
7 Ky. L. Rep. 379 (1885); Cropper v. Gordon, 13 Ky. L. Rep. 140 (1891).
9"5Warwick Turnpike-Road Co. v. Hutchinson & Wilham, 22 Ky.
L. Rep. 201, 56 S. W. 806 (1900).
"Livingston County v. Evans, 220 Ky. 187, 294 S. W. 1044 (1927).
"Breckinridge County v. Beard, 233 Ky. 823, 27 S. W. (2d) 427
(1930).
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liability can attach. Also, unless made otherwise binding, a
subscriber's promise may be revoked at any time prior to the
performance of the condition. 98 On the other hand, the liability of the subscriber is established when the condition is
fulfilled,9 9 providing the agreement is otherwise enforceable.
It is not necessary, however, that the condition shall be strictly
complied with, as ordinarily substantial compliance has been
considered sufficient. 00 'What amounts to substantial compliance sufficient to satisfy a condition in a particular case
is dependent, of course, upon the circumstances surrounding
the case involved. Substantial compliance, which is considered adequate in one case, may not fulfill the requirement in
another case where the facts are somewhat different.
Any discussion of charitable subscriptions must necessarily involve an investigation of the problem of consideration. For without consideration, the subscription agreement
could ordinarily be revoked or terminated at any time prior to
execution, in the absence of some doctrine of policy favoring
the charity as against the individual subscriber. Kentucky is
no exception in this respect, and the Kentucky cases, for the
most part, have fallen in line with the general American view
sanctioning a recovery on the part of the charity by finding
some consideration, fictitious or otherwise and thus obviating
the necessity of overthrowing the orthodox view by embarking
upon an uncharted, though desirable, course.
Consideration may clearly be present where the charity has
expressly agreed to perform some act, such as the construction
of a building, especially where the subscription agreement indicates that such promise was intended to be consideration for the
subscription.' 0 ' A fortiori, the actual performance of the re,8See Bramlette's Adm'x v. Boyce, 4 Ky. L. Rep. 196 (1882).
'*McMillan v. Maysville and Lexington R. R., 54 Ky. 218 (1854);
Paint Lick Turnpike Co. v. Wallace, 6 Ky. Opin. 316 (1873); Anderson
v. West Kentucky College, 10 Ky. L. Rep. 725 (1889); Kentucky Live
Stock Breeders' Ass'n. v. Miller, 119 Ky. 393, 84 S. W. 301 (1905).
:® Baskett v. Ohio Valley Banking and Trust Co., 125 S. W. 1066
(Ky. 1910); Webb v. Dunn, 198 Ky. 111, 248 S. W. 840 (1923); Eagles,
Treasurer v. Hafendorfer, 204 Ky. 696, 265 S. W. 35 (1924); Gaines
v. Hume, 215 Ky. 27, 284 S. W. 119 (1926); Brown v. Farmers' Deposit
Bank, 223 Ky. 171, 3 S. W. (2d) 215 (1928); Wickliffe's Ex'rs. v. Smith,
225 Ky. 796, 10 S. W. (2d) 291 (1928).
"'Ex Parte Walker's Ex'r., 253 Ky. 111, 68 S. W. (2d) 745 (1934).
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quired act would, in itself, constitute sufficient consideration
10 2
to make the subscription thereafter irrevocable.
Where a negotiable instrument has been given for the
amount of the subscription, it is presumed to have been issued
for a valuable consideration, 10 3 and it is unneccessary for the
plaintiff, when suing upon it, to allege that any consideration
was paid. 0 4 On the other hand, a lack of consideration for the
note may be shown by the defendant, 10 5 providing it has not
come into the hands of a holder in due course, thus making such
a defense unavailable. If the defendant does allege a lack of
consideration, he must assume the burden of proving it.1° 6 However, where a note was given by a person as a pledge to be paid
upon the death of the signer, the court has considered such a
transaction as completely executed, and therefore irrevocable
notwithstanding the lack of consideration. The instrument
could only be annulled in equity where there was convincing
proof of an equitable dfeense. 10 7 This might presumably be the
result in any case where the promissory instrument was drawn in
the form of a negotiable note. It is also unnecessary for the
plaintiff to aver consideration in the case of any other kind of
promissory writing, 0 although it may also be impeached by a
2'Chambers v. Baptist Educational Society, 40 Ky. 215 (1841);
Central University of Kentucky v. Walter's Ex'rs., 122 Ky. 65, 90 S. W.
1066 (1906). And see Meddis & Southwick v. Board of Park Com'rs.,
19 Ky. L. Rep. 817, 42 S. W. 98 (1897); Sparks v. Moore, 212 Ky. 720,
279 S. W. 1107 (1926); Gaines v. Hume, 215 Ky. 27, 284 S. W. 119
(1926); Brown v. Farmers' Deposit Bank, 223 Ky. 171, 3 S. W. (2d)
215 (1928); Wickliffe's Ex'rs. v. Smith, 225 Ky. 796, 10 S. W. (2d) 291
(1928).
"'Ky. Stat. (Carroll's, 1936) sec. 3720b-24, Lawyers' Realty Co.
v. Bank of Ludlow, 256 Ky. 675, 76 S. W. (2d) 920 (1934).
2' Torian et al. v. Caldwell et al., 178 Ky. 509, 199 S. W. 35 (1917).
But where one suing upon a note importing a consideration, unnecessarily alleges that it was executed for a valuable consideration, the
burden is upon him to prove it. Cobb v. Farmers and Merchants Bank,
267 Ky. 744, 103 S. W. (2d) 264 (1937).
' 'Allnutt
v. Allnutt's Ex'x., 127 S. W. 986 (Ky. 1910). And see
Lawyers' Realty Co. v. Bank of Ludlow, 256 Ky. 675, 76 S. W. (2d)
920 (1934).
10Richardson's Adm'r. v. Morgan, 233 Ky. 540, 26 S. W. (2d) 32
(1930); Michel v. Rembold, 238 Ky. 260, 37 S. W. (2d) 66 (1931);
Cobb v. Farmers & Merchants Bank, 267 Ky. 744, 103 S. W. (2d) 264
(1937).
,"'7 McDonald's Ex'r. v. Transylvania University, 274 Ky. 168, 118
S. W. (2d) 171 (1937).
118Ky. Stat. (Carroll's 1936) sec. 471, Bronston's Adm'r. v. Lakes,
135 Ky. 173, 121 S. W. 1021 (1909); Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins. Co. v.
Hensley, 206 Ky. 202, 266 S. W. 1074 (1924). And see M'Curdy v.
Dudley, 8 Ky. 288 (1818).

K. L. J.--4
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proof of lack of consideration on the part of the defendant. 109
In many cases no actual consideration can be found, and
even where the subscription agreement is in writing and consideration may be presumed, the defendant may still prove that
consideration was actually lacking. It is in this situation that
the Kentucky cases, with similar reasoning, to those found in
other jurisdictions, have adopted various theories for holding the
subscription irrevocable.
A few Kentucky cases 10 have advanced the view that where
some work has been undertaken, or some liability has been
assumed, as b.result of the subscription, the requisite consideration is thereby provided. In the case of Ex parte Walker's
Ex'r., -11 one of the several subscription agreements involved in
the case stated that it was made in consideration of the Board
of Trustees planning for a church to cost not less than Two
Hundred Thousand Dollars, and also entering into a financial
campaign for that purpose within three months. The validity
of this pledge was conceded, inasmuch as an architect had been
employed to draw up plans for a new church building, and a
campaign to raise funds for its construction had been inaugurated, although nothing had yet been done toward the actual
construction of the church. Even without the express provision as to consideration in the pledge agreement, its validity
would have been upheld. This view is very similar to the doctrine of promissory estoppel, although the Kentucky court
apparently avoids a specific application of that principle, if
possible.1 12 In some instances, however, the court has expressly
recognized estoppel as a substitute for consideration in subscrip11 3
tion cases.
The theory that mutual subscriptions may provide the
requisite consideration for each other, as declared in many of the
,0 Ky. Stat. (Carroll's, 1936) sec. 472, Bronston's Adm'r. v. Lakes,
135 Ky. 173, 121 S. W. 1021 (1909).
1O Collier v. Baptist Education Society, 47 Ky. 68 (1847'); Ellinger's
Adm'r. v. Brown, 9 Ky. Opin. 514 (1877). And see Hatcher-Powers
Shoe Co. v. Hitchins, 232 Ky. 87, 22 S. W. (2d) 444 (1929).
=253 Ky. 111, 68 S. W. (2d) 745 (1933).
212See Ky. Annotations, Restatement, Contracts (1938) see. 90.
" See Bullock v. Falmouth & Chipman Haill Turnpike Road Co.,
85 Ky. 184, 3 S. W. 129 (1887); Curry v. Kentucky Western Ry., 25
Ky. L. Rep. 1372, 78 S. W. 435 (1904). Also see Morton v. Fletcher,
9 Ky. 137 (1819).
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cases in other jurisdictions, 114 does not seem to have been recognized by the Kentucky court as applicable in the case of a
charitable subscription.' 1 5 This is peculiar, inasmuch as the
court has considered the promise of one subscriber as consideration for the subscription of another, where the subscription
involved the donation of land for the construction of a railroad, 1 " and a donation for the construction of a highway for the
benefit of the public. 11 7 Even more readily has the court recognized this mutuality as sufficient consideration, where dealing
with the enforceability of various types of stock subscription
agreements." 8 It is submitted that there is no reason why the
charitable subscription should not also be enforced upon this
theory, if the court is willing to recognize the validity of other
types of subscriptions on this basis. As a matter of policy, the
former should be more readily enforceable than the latter. This
is all the more true, where the subscription agreement expressly
states that it is being made in consideration of the like subscriptions of others, and is thus directly called to the attention
ef the subscriber." 9
A few early Kentucky cases have considered the obligation
of the charity to apply the fund subscribed for carrying out the
'uSee, supra, footnote 42.
For example, in the early case of Goff v. Winchester College,
69 Ky. 443 (1869), Involving the subscription for stock for the pupose of erecting a school, the court said: "Appellants did not undertake by the writing subscribed to pay the 'Winchester College', nor
did they agree mutually with others to pay the sums named; etc."
11
Curry v. Kentucky Western Ry., 25 Ky. L. Rep. 1372, 78 S. W.
435 (1904).
n 7 Eagles, Treasurer v. Hafendorfer, 204 Ky. 696, 265 S. W. 35
(1924). And see Warwick Turnpike-Road Co. v. Hutchinson & Wilham,
22 Ky. L. Rep. 201, 56 S. W. 806 (1900), where the court said: "If the
road had been macadamized by popular subscription and left a free
county road, probably the paper would have bound its signers on the
ground
of a mutual subscription for a public good; etc."
-1 Tully v. Cane Run & Kingsmill Turnpike Road Co., 5 Ky. Opin.
330 (1871); Twin Creek and Colemansville Turnpike Road Co. v.
Lancaster, 79 Ky. 552 (1881); Chicago Bldg. & Mfg. Co. v. Peterson,
133 Ky. 596, 118 S. W. 384 (1909); Gannon v. Grayson Water Co., 254
Ky. 251, 71 S. W. (2d) 433 (1934).
-For an example of a provision in a subscription agreement that
the pledge was made in consideration of other pledges, see McDonald's
Ex'r. v. Transylvania University, 274 Ky. 168, 118 S. W. (2d) 171
(1937).
Another example may be found in the Jefferson County
Community Chest subscription cards for the year 1940, which read:
"In consideration of the subscriptions of others to the Community
Chest of Jefferson County, Ky., I promise to pay the sum of etc."
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charitable and benevolent purpose of the institution, 120 or to
use the money for the specific purpose for which it was subscribed, 121 as providing sufficient consideration to render the
promise legally enforceable. Thus, the implied promise of the
promisee, at the time when the subscription is made, to use the
funds in a certain manner, whether expressly so designated or
not, makes the agreement immediately irrevocable, so that neither
the death nor change of mind of the donor can in any way affect
its validity. Surprisingly enough, there seem to have been no
recent Kentucky cases upholding this theory.
After the validity of the subscription contract has been
established with respect to performance of conditions and sufficiency of consideration, liability may still be avoided by the
subscriber on the ground of false representations or a suppression of the truth by the solicitor, 22 or in a case where the required conditions were performed through some fraudulent
means. 123 In order to avoid the contract on the ground of fraud
or mistake, the evidence of such must be clear and convincing,'124
and the fraud must have resulted from the misrepresentation as
to a material fact, as distinguished from an opinion or promise
for the future. In addition, the misrepresentation must have
been made with knowledge of its falsity, and also must have been
relied upon by the subscriber. 12 5 Also, where the agreement is in
writing, the presumption is in favor of the writing, and the
person'who attempts to avoid it on the ground of fraud or mistake must bear the burden of proof, and must establish it by
means of satisfactory and substantial evidence.' 26
Collier v. Baptist Education Society, 47 Ky. 68 (1847); Trustees
Kentucky Female Orphan School v. Fleming, 73 Ky. 234 (1874).
m Bramlette's Adm'x. v. Boyce, 4 Ky. L.Rep. 196 (1882).
2 Chambers v. Baptist Educational Society, 40 Ky. 215 (1841).
12 Sigler v. R. W. Winstead & Co., 125 S.W. 272 (Ky. 1910). And
under these circumstances, not only may the subscriber refuse to
comply with his promise to subscribe, but if he has already made his
contribution under such an agreement, such contribution may be
recovered. See Jenkins & Crane v. R. W. Winstead & Co., 143 Ky. 473,
136 S.W. 899 (1911).
324 Haag & Brother v. Damon Manufacturing Co., 153 Ky. 840, 156
S.W. 884 (1913); Cornett v. Kentucky River Coal Co., 175 Ky. 718, 195
-S.W. 149 (1917).
1 Livermore v. Middlesborough Town-Lands Co., 106 Ky. 140, 50
S.W. 6 (1899); The Chicago Bldg. & Mfg. Co. v. Beaven, 149 Ky. 267,
148 S.W. 37 (1912).
I." Western Mfg. Co. v. Cotton & Long, 126 Ky. 749, 104 S.W. 758
(1907); Teater v. Teater, 159 Ky. 111, 166 S.W. 797 (1914).

CHARITABLE SUBSCRIPTION CONTRACTS IN KENTUCKY

47

CONCLUSION

It is somewhat doubtful just what course the Kentucky
Court of Appeals will take when the question of charitable subscriptions arises in the future, because of the scarcity of precedent upon this specific problem. It is encouraging to note that
there are apparently no cases which have declared against the
sustaining of a charitable subscription agreement because of lack
of consideration, although there also appear to be no recent
cases directly favoring such a recovery.- Inasmuch as the tendency of the decisions throughout the country seems to be so
predominantly in favor of the charity, and since there is no
expression to the contrary in the reported Kentucky cases, it is
probable that when the occasion arises, the Kentucky Court will
follow the present trend and allow a recovery upon one justification or another. Here is an opportunity which should not be
overlooked, and the Court would do well to recognize, not only
that public policy should be an important factor to consider,
but indeed that such policy, in itself, should be enough to control its decision. By so doing, it would avoid the precarious
course that some courts have taken, and would establish itself
as a court unafraid to legislate judicially, when considering a
problem which so vitally involves the public welfare.

